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The purpose of this research was to examine the impact of ownership structure, dividend 
policy, firm size, and capital structure on agency cost. The sample that was used in this 
research consisted of 32 manufacturing companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange in 
2010 and 2011. This study used simple linear regression analysis to test the data. Using the 
convidence interval of 95%, statistical results show that the insider ownership and the capital 
structure have significant and negative impact on the agency cost. On the other hand, it is 
found that the institutional ownership has significantly positive impact on the agency cost. 
However, researcher found no evidence that the dividend policy and firm size have 
significant impact on the agency cost. These results could be considered as one of the criteria 
to create proper corporate governance for firms’ management as well as investment criteria 
for investors. 
 





 According to the agency theory, as 
a firm is getting bigger, it is also getting 
harder for the owners to govern the firm.  
In this situation, the owners would appoint 
managers to replace them in governing the 
firm.  The owners would give right to the 
managers to act as decision makers for the 
firm on their behalf.  This would create a 
separation of ownership and control inside 
the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 The separation of ownership and 
control could lead to an agency problem.  
An agency problem usually happens when 
one or more parties (principals) delegate 
their work to other parties (agents) 
(Naiker, Navissi, & Sridharan, 2008).  The 
responsibility of the managers is to make 
sure that the firm is able to achieve its 
main objective, which is maximizing the 
wealth of its shareholders.  However, in 
many occasions the managers tend to 
make decisions for their own interests 
instead of the shareholders’ interests 
(manager expropriation).  This particularly 
happens whenever there is information 
which is only known by the managers 
relative to the owners (asymmetric 
information).  The inability to unify the 
interests of each party would create a 
conflict which is called agency conflict or 
agency problem. 
 Agency problem might result in 
agency cost.  Agency cost could be 
described as the misused of a firm’s assets 
by the manager for ineffective and 
unnecessary activities (Fachrudin, 2011).  
Fachrudin also defined agency cost as the 
assets that are used by the principals as 
incentives for the agents, or used for 
monitoring the agents in order to prevent 
hazards.  Agency costs could lead to the 
correction of share price of the firms and 
reduce the firm values as well as 
shareholders wealth.  
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 Fachrudin (2011) separated agency 
cost in some forms; which are incentives 
or bonuses given to the managers, 
monitoring cost, bonding cost, residual 
loss, and missused spending of free cash 
flow by the managers.  Firms with large 
amount of free cash flow are expected to 
give the free cash flow to the shareholders 
as dividend.  This should be done to 
prevent the use of the free cash flow for 
useless activities or unprofitable 
investment by the managers. 
 Agency cost may not be 
eliminated, however it could be 
minimized.  There are some factors and 
mechanisms that can be used to minimize 
the amount of agency cost.  For example, 
ownership structure can determine the 
amount of agency cost (Ang, Rebel, & Lin 
2000; Gul, Sajid, Razzaq, & Afzal, 2012).  
Firm size and capital structure can also 
determine the amount of agency cost 
(Fachrudin, 2011).  Byrd (2010)  also 
suggested that another determinant of 
agency cost is dividend policy.  
 This research aims to examine the 
impact of several factors mentioned above 
on the amount of agency cost.  Research 
on this topic have usually been done 
outside Indonesia especially in developed 
countries, and many of them used small-
unlisted firms or family businesses as the 
objects (e.g., Ang et al., 2000; Gul et al. 
2012; McKnight & Wheir, 2008; 
Mohammed, 2013).  There are only a few 
numbers of research on this topic that have 
been done in developing countries, 
particularly in Indonesia.  In addition, 
conflicting results were found on previous 
research that makes this research worth to 
be done.  Within this research, the 
researcher statistically tested the impact of 
some factors, such as ownership structure, 
firm size, capital structure, and dividend 




 This section discusses the theories 
that were used to develop this study.  First, 
it discusses agency theory and agency 
conflict that can result in agency cost.  
Then it discusses agency cost.  Finally, this 
section discusses several factors that could 
affect agency cost. 
 Agency Theory. Agency theory 
was popularized by Jensen and Meckling 
in 1976.  This theory describes the 
relationship between the owner (principal) 
and the manager (agent).  The main 
objective of a firm is to maximize the 
wealth of its owner.  In the progress, the 
owner would meet some limitations in 
governing the firm in order to achieve its 
objective.  To overcome those limitations, 
the owner would hire managers (agents) to 
help manage the organization.  At this 
point, the owners (shareholders) and 
managers would build a relationship that 
can be translated into the delegation of 
authority from shareholders to managers to 
make decision and action within the firm 
on behalf of the shareholders (Imanta & 
Satwiko, 2011). 
 The agency theory assumes that all 
parties within a firm act according to their 
best interests which can cause a conflict of 
interest that is called agency problem.  
Agency problem basically arises from the 
separation of control and ownership 
between managers and shareholders within 
the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The 
shareholders are assumed only to be 
interested in a huge return for their 
investment as fast as possible; one way is 
through dividend.  On the other hand, 
managers are motivated on receiving 
incentives or bonuses as much as possible 
for their work (Imanta & Satwiko, 2011).  
From the agency problem, a concept called 
corporate governance emerges; this 
describes the mechanism of how a firm 
should be governed.  The corporate 
governance concept may help to direct 
how managers should be accountable to 
shareholders (Margaretha & Asmariani, 
2009). 
 Agency Cost. The divergence in 
interest between the principals and agents 
would harm the welfare of shareholders 
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(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The amount 
of money equal to the reduction of 
shareholders welfare is referred to as 
residual loss.  When there is a conflict of 
interest between the principal and agent, 
the principal could limit the divergences 
between both parties in some ways.  The 
shareholders, as the principal, may 
establish appropriate incentives for the 
agent or incurring monitoring costs to limit 
the managers’ decision.  In addition, the 
shareholders may expend some resources 
for the managers to guarantee that their 
action would not harm the shareholders’ 
welfare.  All the residual and the costs 
spent to prevent the managers from 
missusing the company’s assets are 
referred to as agency cost.  Most probably, 
these costs could not be avoided.  The 
avoidance of these costs might result in the 
value of the firm being lower than 
otherwise it should be. 
 Ownership Structure and 
Agency Cost. One aspect that affects the 
amount of agency cost is the ownership 
structure within the firms.  The agency 
cost increases when the ownership of a 
single owned-manager of the firm is less 
than 100% (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Based on this idea, the situation of a no-
agency cost can only occur when there is 
only one owner who acts as the manager in 
governing the firm; therefore, this would 
not work in public owned companies. 
 According to the agency theory, 
Ang et al. (2000) concluded that the 
percentage of insider ownership within the 
firm could affect the amount of agency 
cost.  If the agents have large amount of 
ownership in the firm, the agency problem 
is not likely to happen, and the agency cost 
can be reduced.  This can be shown in 
small-unlisted and family businesses 
where the owners usually act as the 
managers in the firms.  In this case, the 
amount of agency costs is usually lower. 
 Some parts of the firms’ capital are 
usually owned by other institutions.  
Institutional shareholders usually have 
large amount of firms’ ownership.  Most 
of the time they play a key role in reducing 
the amount of agency cost (Gul et al., 
2012).  Nekounam, Hossini, and Ahmadi 
(2013) showed that institutional ownership 
and agency cost have a positive 
relationship.  This means that the increase 
of institutional ownership would also 
increase the amount of agency cost.  This 
can be possible because institutional 
shareholders would monitor the action of 
managers and influence the managerial 
decision making.  Compared to public 
shareholders, institutional shareholders can 
monitor the managerial actions at lower 
cost because they have more resources and 
expertise.  Thus, the hypothesis would be: 
H1:  Insider ownership has impact on 
agency cost. 
H2:  Institutional ownership has impact 
on agency cost. 
 Dividend Policy and Agency 
Cost. Dividend is one mechanism that can 
be used to minimize agency cost.  High 
dividend payment can also reduce the 
conflict between managers and 
shareholders.  According to Mollah, 
Rafiqul, and Sharp (2007) dividend 
payment reduces agency cost because it 
becomes a part of firms monitoring and 
bonding activities.  The payment of 
dividend would also reduce the amount of 
available assets that could be used by the 
manager for unnecessary investment or 
spending.  Byrd (2010) found that high 
dividend policy tend to result in lower 
agency cost.  Nevertheless, Widana Putra 
and Ratnadi (2008) found no evidence that 
dividend policy could affect agency cost. 
With dividend payment, a firm will give 
the available free cash flow to the 
shareholders and, at the same time, prevent 
the misuse of free cash flow by the 
managers.  The hypothesis would be: 
H3:  Dividend policy has impact on 
agency cost. 
 Firm Size and Agency Cost. Firm 
size also has an impact on agency cost.  
Fachrudin (2011) suggested that larger 
firms usually operate more efficiently; 
therefore, they have less agency cost 
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compared to smaller business entities.  
Compared to smaller firms, larger firm 
need less discretionary expense to operate.  
Discretionary expense is one indicator of 
agency cost.  Large companies also have a 
better mechanism of good corporate 
governance to prevent managers to take 
unnecessary decision that can harm the 
shareholders’ welfare.  Therefore, the 
hypothesis would be: 
H4:  Firm size has impact on agency 
cost. 
 Capital Structure and Agency 
Cost. Another way to reduce the amount 
of agency cost is by using debt.  Debt can 
be used as a tool to discipline managers 
(Mohammed, 2013).  The availability of 
debt will result in interest expense and 
reduce the amount of free cash flow that 
can be used for managerial decision.  
Managers would be carefully making their 
decision to make sure that the firm will be 
able to pay the debt and its interests.  In 
this situation, creditors would also monitor 
the decision made by the managers to 
make sure that their credit and interest can 
be paid.  Below is the hypothesis:  





Research Design. This research 
used a causal design that determines the 
cause and effect relationship between two 
or more objects.  A causal study is used 
because the purpose of this research is to 
investigate the effect of independent 
variables (i.e. insider ownership, 
institutional ownership, dividend policy, 
firm size, and capital structure) on the 
dependent variable (i.e. agency cost) in the 
manufacturing companies listed on IDX 
from 2010 to 2011.  This research used 
statistical technique to analyze those 
variables in order to test the hypotheses. 
Population and Sample. The 
population of this research is 
manufacturing companies listed on IDX 
from 2010 to 2011. Meanwhile, the sample 
of this research is chosen through 
purposive sampling technique where all of 
the criteria must be fulfilled in order to 
avoid any bias.  The criteria in the 
sampling are: (1) the sample companies 
are manufacturing companies consistently 
listed on IDX and published their annual 
reports in 2010 to 2011, (2) disclosed the 
information about insider ownership and 
institutional ownership in the annual 
reports, (3) paid dividend regularly, (4) 
fiscal year ended on December 31.  
Finally, the sampling criteria were met by 
only 32 companies, therefore, there are 64 
firm-year observations used in this 
research. 
Data Collection. The data 
collection process began by finding out the 
data that is needed in this study and the 
source of the data, followed by 
downloading the data in the annual report 
of the manufacturing companies from IDX 
website for the period of 2010 to 2011.   
The annual reports were being reviewed to 
see if the annual report contains the data 
that is needed, and checked if the data 
meet the given criteria.  Data that have 
passed the review phase and met the given 
criteria were tabulated and analyzed using 
STATA. 
Research Model. There is one 
dependent variable (i.e., agency cost) and 
five independent variables (i.e., insider 
ownership, institutional ownership, 
dividend policy, firm size, and capital 
structure) that are used in this research.  
The general model of simple linear 
regression was developed to analyze each 
hypothesis in this study.  The regression 
models that were used to test the 
hypotheses are: 
H1: ACOS = α + β INDOit + Ԑ 
H2: ACOS = α + β INTOit + Ԑ 
H3: ACOS = α + β DIVDit + Ԑ 
H4: ACOS = α + β SIZEit + Ԑ 
H5: ACOS = α + β CAPSit + Ԑ 
Where,  
ACOS =  Discretionary expense ratio of 
company i on year t, measured by 
discretionary expense (expense that could 
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be controlled by the management for 
example travel expense, entertainment 
expense, advertising expense, and 
maintenance expense) divided by revenue. 
INDO = Insider ownership of 
company i on year t, measured by the 
percentage of the ownership that is held by 
the board of directors and the board of 
commissioner. 
INTO =  Institutional ownership of 
company i on year t, measured by the 
percentage of shares owned by other 
institutions. 
DIVD =   Dividend policy of 
company i on year t, measured dividend 
payout ratio which is the ratio of cash 
dividend to net income. 
SIZE = Firm size of company i on year t, 
measured by the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s total assets.   
CAPS =  Capital structure of 
company i on year t, measured by debt to 
equity ratio. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Classical Assumption Tests 
Heteroskedasticity Test. 
Heteroskedasticity problem occurs when 
the variance of a variable is not constant. 
To conduct the Heteroskedasticity test, the 
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test in 
STATA was used.  The results can be seen 
on Table 1.  
 
Table 1 Heteroskedasticity Test 
 







Table 1 shows that the probability value 
for H01, H02, and H05 are less than 0.05, 
which means that there are 
heteroskedasticity problems for those 
hypotheses testing. However, the 
heteroskedasticity problem was able to be 
controlled by using robust standard error.  
Autocorrelation Test. To test the 
autocorrelation, Breusch-Godfrey LM test 
was conducted in STATA. The results can 
be seen on Table 2, which shows that the 
probability values of the autocorrelation 
test for all hypotheses are more than 0.05, 
which means there are no autocorrelation 
problem in the data. 
 
Table 2 Autocerelation Test 







Insider Ownership and Agency 
Cost. The result of the first hypothesis 
testing can be seen on Table 3.  Table 3 
shows the impact of the insider ownership 
on the agency cost. The table shows that 
the p-value is 0.000 which is lower than 
0.05. The result concludes that H01 is 
rejected, which means that the insider 
ownership has a significant impact on the 
agency cost. Table 3 also shows that the 
unstandardized coefficient beta is -0.499, 
which means the insider ownership has 
negative impact on agency cost. 
 
Table 3. The Impact of Insider 
Ownership on Agency Cost 
Variable Coefficient p > | t| 
INDO -0.499 0.000 
CONSTANT 0.125 0.000 
Dependent Variable  ACOS 
R-squared   0.125 
F Test    39.31 
Prob > F   0.000 
Number of Observation 64  
 
This result is similar to the findings 
of studies conducted by Ang et al. in 2000 
and Gul et al. in 2012. They concluded 
that higher insider ownership might result 
on lower agency cost.  This might be 
caused by higher control of the owner-
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manager inside the firms. Higher 
proportion of insider ownership would 
make it easier to align the stockholders’ 
interests with the managers’ interests 
within the firm. This also creates a sense 
of belonging among the managers toward 
the firm. When a manager also acts as the 
owner of the firm, he/she tends to 
maximise his/her return as the firm’s 
owner instead of maximising the benefit as 
a manager. 
Institutional Ownership and 
Agency Cost. The result of the second 
hypothesis testing is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 shows the impact of the insider 
ownership on the agency cost. The table 
shows that the p-value is 0.021 which is 
lower than 0.05. The result concludes that 
H02 is rejected, meaning that the 
institutional ownership has a significant 
impact on the agency cost. It can be seen 
that the unstandardized coefficient beta is 
0.159, which means the institutional 
ownership has a positive impact on the 
agency cost. An increase on the percentage 
of the institutional ownership by 1% might 
result in an increase of the percentage of 
the agency cost by 0.159%.   
 
Table 4. The Impact of Institutional 
Ownership on Agency Cost 
Variable Coefficient p > | t| 
INTO 0.159 0.021 
CONSTANT -0.005 0.916 
Dependent Variable  ACOS 
R-squared   0.072 
F Test    5.64 
Prob > F   0.021 
Number of Observation 64  
 
This result is similar to the study of 
Nekounam et al. (2013) in Iran which 
concluded that the increase of institutional 
ownership would also increase the amount 
of agency cost. This might be the result of 
more dispersed of institutional ownership 
on the majority of samples; which causes 
the lack of control power by the 
institutions toward the firm. It is also 
similar to another finding in Nekounam et 
al.’s study which  found that more 
dispersed institutional ownership may 
cause larger agency cost. This situation is 
more likely to create agency cost on a 
firm. 
Dividend Policy and Agency 
Cost. The result of the third hypothesis 
testing can be seen in Table 5.  This table 
shows that the p-value is 0.501 which is 
higher than 0.05. The result concludes that 
H03 is failed to reject. That means 
dividend policy does not have significant 
influence on agency cost.   
 
Table 5. The Impact of Dividend Policy 
on Agency Cost 
Variable Coefficient p > | t | 
DIVD 0.266 0.501 
CONSTANT 0.100 0.000 
Dependent Variable  ACOS 
R-squared   0.007 
F Test    0.46 
Prob > F   0.501 
Number of Observation 64  
 
This result is similar to the finding 
of a study conducted by Widana Putra and 
Ratnadi (2008). They found no evidence 
that dividend policy could affect agency 
cost. It might be caused by the fluctuation 
or relatively small dividend payment made 
by the sample firms. The sample firms that 
were used in this research probably are 
still growing. Thus, they make several new 
investments and develop more research. In 
this situation, the shareholders might not 
pay too much attention on dividend 
payment because the dividend policy may 
not affect their benefits in the short-term. 
Firm Size and Agency Cost. The 
result of the statistic test for the fourth 
hypothesis is shown in Table 6.  The 
results show that the p-value is 0.715 
which is higher than 0.05. The result 
concludes that H04 is failed to reject. That 
means the firm size does not have 
significant impact on the agency cost. 
 
Table 6. The Impact of Firm Size on 
Agency Cost 
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Variable Coefficient p > | t | 
SIZE 0.002 0.715 
CONSTANT 0.061 0.647 
Dependent Variable  ACOS 
R-squared   0.002 
F Test    0.13 
Prob > F   0.715 
Number of Observation 64  
 
 The size  of the firm could not 
control the amount of the agency cost. 
This might be the result of different types 
of problems that are caused by the 
difference in size. Small and large firms 
posses diferent problems that might results 
in agency cost. Small firms are lack of 
effective good corporate governace 
mechanism that could easily lead the 
managers to commit unnecesary spending. 
On the other hand, large firms have more 
complex business process and information 
dificulties that may result in lack of control 
toward the managers of the firm. The 
problems might be different, but all of 
them might cause agency cost. 
Capital Structure and Agency 
Cost. The result of the statistic test for the 
fifth hypothesis is shown in Table 7.  It 
shows the impact of the capital structure 
on the agency cost where the p-value is 
0.002. The result concludes that H05 is 
rejected. That means the capital structure 
has significant impact on the agency cost.  
Table 7 also shows that the unstandardized 
coefficient beta is -0.050, which indicates 
the capital structure has a negative impact 
on the agency cost. An increase on the 
percentage of the debt to equity ratio by 
1% might result in the decrease of the 
percentage of the agency cost by 0.050%. 
 
Table 7. The Impact of Capital 
Structure on Agency Cost 
Variable Coefficient p > | t | 
CAPS -0.050 0.002 
CONSTANT 0.150 0.000 
Dependent Variable  ACOS 
R-squared   0.108 
F Test    10.52 
Prob > F   0.002 
Number of Observation 64  
This result is consistent with the 
studies of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Brigham and Daves (cited in Fachrudin, 
2011) which suggested that a high debt 
ratio was effective to reduce the amount of 
agency cost. The increase of debt in the 
capital structure would increase the risk 
that the firm is not able to pay the interests 
and principals. This might cause the 
managers to be more cautious in making 
decision and reduce unnecessary spending 
to ensure that the firm is able to pay the 
interest and the principal when the debt is 
mature. Also this will give creditors some 
control toward the firm. The controling 
power from the debt holder will limit the 





This study examined several 
factors that were considered to affect the 
amount of agency cost within a company. 
To test those factors, manufacturing 
companies listed on IDX from 2010 to 
2011 were used as the population. 
However, only 32 companies met all the 
sampling criteria. 
The first factor tested in this study 
is the composition of ownership within the 
firms. This research found that the insider 
ownership has a significantly negative 
impact on the agency cost, meaning that 
by increasing the amount of the insider 
ownership, it could help the firm to reduce 
the agency cost. The result also showed 
that the second factor, the outsider 
ownership held by other institutions, has a 
significantly positive impact on the agency 
cost.  Another factor tested in this study is 
the dividend policy which is commonly 
used as monitoring and bonding 
mechanism for the management.  It is 
found that the dividend policy does not 
have significant impact on the agency cost 
of manufacturing companies listed on 
IDX.  The firm size is also considered to 
be able to affect agency cost. Larger firms 
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are deemed to have better procedure and 
more effective corporate governance 
compared to smaller firms. However, this 
study found that the size of the firm does 
not affect the amount of the agency cost.  
The last factor that was tested in this study 
is capital structure.  This research found a 
similar result from previous studies that 
the capital structure has a significantly 
negative impact on the agency cost. This 
means by increasing the debt, the amount 
of the agency cost could be reduced. 
The results of this study could be 
considered as one of the criteria to create 
proper corporate governance as well as 
investment criteria in order to mitigate the 
agency cost in manfacturing firms. For the 
firms’ management, the management 
could consider to increase the percentage 
of debt within the capital structure in order 
to lower the agency cost that might occur.  
For firm owners and investors, it should be 
considered to give more proportion of 
ownership to the managers as it might 
lower the agency cost. Investors could also 
consider to invest their money on firms 
that have lower proportion of institutional 
ownership, as firms with higher 
institutional ownership might have higher 
agency cost. 
 This research has several 
limitations.  First, it is only conducted on 
two-year time period. Different or longer 
time period could have different results. 
Second, this research is conducted only in 
one sector in IDX. The result of one sector 
could not be generalized to other sectors 
because of different characteristics that 
they possess. Third, this study did not test 
all factors that might be able to control the 
agency cost. There are other factors which 
are considered to be able to affect the 
agency cost such as concentration of 
ownership, risk, board size, and CEO 
duality. Fourth, this study only used 
discretionary expense as the proxy of the 
agency cost. There are several other 
measurements that could be used as the 
proxy of agency cost such as asset 
utilization ratio, numbers of investment 
taken by the firm, and the interaction of 
free cash flow and growth opportunity. 
 With the given limitations, there 
are several recommendations that could be 
considered for future research. First, future 
researcher could use longer time period to 
get more accurate result. Second, future 
researcher could conduct the study in other 
sectors or all companies listed on IDX. 
Third, future researcher could test other 
factors that might affect the agency cost. 
Lastly, Future researcher could also use 
other measurements as the proxy of the 
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